



8 July 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: Discussion of the NRO at the PFIAB**

1. Mr. Clifford informed me today that he expects Mr. Vance, who is appearing before the PFIAB tomorrow, and you to brief the Board on the status of the negotiations on the NRO. In this connection, the conversation which I had with Dr. Fubini today is relevant.
2. Dr. Fubini told me that he will advise Mr. Vance not to read the draft agreement which was given to you last week, and ~~would~~ confine himself to generalities. I told Dr. Fubini that the draft agreement was ~~totally~~ unacceptable in a number of respects, particularly as regards the constitution of the Executive Committee which is relegated to the position of advisors or consultants to the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Fubini told me that it had to be this way because the Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the NRP. I said that both the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Vance, on different occasions, had agreed that there must be duality of control over the program and that this should be exercised through an Executive Committee consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI exercising joint authority. Mr. McNamara had endorsed this concept, his only reservation being that perhaps the President's scientific advisor should be added to the committee, at least when R&D matters are under review.
3. I also told Dr. Fubini that, in addition to other deficiencies, his draft agreement eliminated the DCI's and USIB's

control over the scheduling of satellite launches and constituted a retreat from the earlier DoD position that scheduling and targetting operations was an intelligence responsibility. (The current SecDef paper on the MOL is a flagrant example of the violation of this concept.)

4. Dr. Fubini also advised me that it was his understanding that at the meeting between you and Mr. Vance last Thursday, it was agreed that the OXCART program should be transferred to the Air Force.

5. It strikes me that the critical issues in the NRO negotiations shape up as follows:

a. The integrity of the Executive Committee concept as a joint board with the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense as members must be maintained and is not negotiable.

b. There are a number of issues which are more or less negotiable, including:

(1) The extent to which the NRO (as contrasted to CIA or the Air Force) will be responsible for engineering, development and production of a system after the concept has been approved. Mr. Vance believes that we are committed to the proposition that the NRO will assume this responsibility except in very unusual circumstances.

(2) The allocation of responsibility for OXCART. (We believe this should be retained in CIA.)

(3) The location of the SOC. (We believe this should be located in CIA.)

cc: DDCI  
ExDir-Comptroller

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIFE